Abstract. In secure two-party function evaluation Alice holding initially a secret input x and Bob having a secret input y communicate to determine a prescribed function f (x, y) in such a way that after the computation Bob learns f (x, y) but nothing more about x other than he could deduce from y and f (x, y) alone, and Alice learns nothing. Unconditionally secure function evaluation is known to be essentially impossible even in the quantum world. In this paper we introduce a new, weakened, model for security in two-party quantum computations. In our model -we call it susceptible function computation -if one party learns something about the input of the other one with advantage ε then the probability that the correct value f (x, y) is computed, when the protocol completes, is at most 1 − δ(ε), for some function δ of ε. Thus, this model allows to measure the trade-off between the advantage of a dishonest party and the error induced by its attack. Furthermore, we present a protocol for computing the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer function that achieves a quadratic trade-off i.e. δ = Ω(ε 2 ).
Introduction
In two-party computation, Alice holding initially a private (i.e., secret) input x ∈ {0, 1} n and Bob having a private input y ∈ {0, 1} m communicate to determine a given function f (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} p . In the standard one-sided setting the computation is secure if the, possible malicious, parties with unbounded computing power perform a communication protocol in such a way that (1) at the end of an honest execution of the protocol Bob learns the value f (x, y) unambiguously (2) no matter what Bob does he cannot learn anything more about x other than what follows from the values of y and f (x, y), and (3) no matter what Alice does, she learns nothing.
In [6] Beimel, Malkin, and Micali have given a combinatorial characterization of all securely computable functions in classical setting. It is proved there that f can be computed securely if and only if there do not exist inputs x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 such that f (x 0 , y 0 ) = f (x 1 , y 0 ) and f (x 0 , y 1 ) = f (x 1 , y 1 ). Unfortunately, almost all useful functions fail to satisfy this criterion.
An important example of a function that cannot be computed in such way is the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer function OT defined as follows: let Alice hold initially two secret bits a 0 , a 1 and let Bob have a secret selection bit i. Then we define OT((a 0 , a 1 ), i) = a i . The problem has been proposed in [16, 15, 12] as a generalization of Rabin's notion for oblivious transfer [22] . Oblivious transfer is a primitive of central importance particularly in secure two-party and multi-party computations. It is well known ( [18, 9] ) that OT can be used as a basic component to construct protocols solving more sophisticated tasks of secure computations such as two-party oblivious circuit evaluation.
The impossibility of (unconditionally) secure function computations in the classical setting rises a question whether, and if so -in which way, quantum cryptography can ensure the security. Indeed, much interest has been devoted to develop quantum two-party protocols [3, 4, 8, 14, 13, 10, 7, 23] , some of which were claimed to be unconditionally secure [10, 7, 23] . However, in his paper [21] Lo proved that such (unconditionally) secure computations of all non-trivial functions are impossible even in quantum setting. As a corollary, a possibility of a secure quantum computation of the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer function OT is ruled out.
Moreover, Lo [21] generalized his impossibility result to non-ideal protocols, being ones that may violate the security constraints (1)-(3) slightly. In his 'nonideal' model the requirements are relaxed as follows:
(1 ) The density matrix that Bob has at the end of the protocol can be slightly different from an eigenstate of the measurement operator that he is supposed to use (thus, the correctness with probability 1 is not guaranteed any more, even if parties follow the protocol honestly). (2 ) There is allowed a small probability of Alice's distinguishing between different Bob's inputs. (3 ) There is allowed also a small probability of Bob's distinguishing between different Alice's inputs.
So, intuitively, the result of Lo states that there is no quantum protocol for computing any non-trivial function such that its correctness is high and the information leakage is small. In this paper we consider a slightly different relaxation of ideal case of the security requirements for the one-sided two-party computation. Our model, we call it susceptible function computation, requires the constraint (1) (i.e. an honest execution of the protocol computes f (x, y) correctly) but it allows, even huge information gain by a cheater. However, it requires that if the leakage is big then the probability that Bob computes the correct value f (x, y) is proportionally small. In other words (precise definition will be given in Section 2), for a function δ(·) we require that for all inputs x and y (a) If both parties follow the protocol then at the end of the computation Bob learns the value f (x, y) unambiguously.
(b) If Alice learns y with advantage ε then the probability that Bob computes the correct value f (x, y) at the end of the protocol, is at most 1 − δ(ε), for some function δ of ε. (c) If Bob with advantage ε learns about x more than what follows from the values of y and f (x, y) then the probability that Bob is able to compute correctly the value f (x, y) is at most 1 − δ(ε).
Particularly, if both Alice and Bob honestly perform a δ(ε)-susceptible protocol, for an appropriate function δ, then Bob learns the value f (x, y) correctly and he gains no additional information about x and Alice learns nothing about y. Note, that in our model Bob cannot get full knowledge about x; otherwise he would be able to compute f (x, y) correctly, what contradicts requirement (c). Intuitively, our model investigates the security of two-party computations when, for some external reasons, the correct computation of f (x, y) is desired by both parties that are, nevertheless, curious to acquire additional knowledge about the input of the other party. To get this additional information a cheating party may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol.
1 But, the key feature of our model is that it imposes a trade-off between the addition knowledge that a cheating party can infer and the correctness of the value f (x, y) computed by Bob. Particularly, if for given Alice's input x and Bob's input y the parties need to compute the correct value f (x, y) with probability 1 then for any strategy used by a cheating party he or she is not able to gain any additional information. However, if for some external reasons, it is sufficient that the protocol may compute the correct value with probability (at least) 1 − ε then a cheater may get some (limited) additional information, and the amount of information is bounded by δ(ε).
The main result of this paper states that for the OT function there exists a susceptible protocol with δ(ε) = Ω(ε 2 ). Hence, we show that a non-trivial function can be computed Ω(ε 2 )-susceptible. That is, we give an OT protocol which, speaking informally (precise definitions are presented in Section 3), fulfills the following properties.
-If both Alice having initially bits a 0 , a 1 and Bob having bit i are honest then Bob learns the selected bit a i , but he gains no further information about the other bit and Alice learns nothing. -If Bob is honest and has a bit i and Alice learns i with advantage ε then for all input bits a 0 , a 1 ∈ {0, 1} the probability that Bob computes the correct value a i , when the protocol completes, is at most 1 − Ω(ε 2 ). -If Alice is honest and has bits a 0 , a 1 then for every input bit i ∈ {0, 1} it is true that if Bob can predict the value a 1−i with advantage ε then the probability that Bob learns correctly a i is at most
Such a model of function evaluation is new and there exists no classical counterpart of such susceptible two-party computations. This follows from a combinatorial characterization of functions securely computable in the honestbut-curious model given by Beaver [5] and Kushilevitz [20] as well as from the characterization theorem of privately computable functions in a weak sense by Chor and Kushilevitz [11] . Though these papers study the so called two-sided setting, in which both parties learn the result of the function when the protocol is completed, we can apply them for the one-sided model for slightly modified functions: we replace the original function f (x, y) by r ⊕ f (x, y) where r is an additional Bob's input and ⊕ denotes the bitwise xor-function. Now, using this modification one can conclude from [5, 20] that if a classical (one-sided) protocol computes OT correctly with probability 1 then its information leakage is strictly greater than 0.
Moreover, from [11] we get that if a classical protocol computes OT correctly with probability 1 − ε, then one of the parties can learn something about the input of the other one with advantage at least 1 2 −ε. The characterization from [11] holds for honest-but-curious players, but we can apply it also to the malicious setting: we just make the malicious party to use the honest-but-curious strategy to cheat. Thus, the theorem by Chor and Kushilevitz can also be used to analyze even malicious attacks. Clearly, the above assertions invalidate existence of any susceptible two-party protocols in classical setting.
Comparison to Previous Work. For secure two-party computations two models are considered in the literature. In the first one, the honest-but-curious model, we assume that the players never deviate from the given protocol but try to acquire knowledge about the input of the other player only by observing the communication. In the second setting, the malicious model, Alice or Bob may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol to defeat the security constraints. Moreover, depending on the computational power of the players we distinguish between computationally security and information theoretically security. In the first case we assume that any player is computationally bounded and in the second case we do not restrict the computational power of the players.
Recall, that in the classical malicious model, only few (trivial) functions can be computed securely in the information theoretic setting ( [6] ). The similar holds also for the honest-but-curious model. This follows from the characterization by Beaver [5] and Kushilevitz [20] . In [19] Klauck shows that in the honest-butcurious model quantum computations do not help. He proves that every function that can be computed securely using a quantum protocol can also be computed securely by a deterministic protocol.
2 On the other hand, he shows that allowing a small leakage, quantum communication allows us to compute Boolean functions which are not securely computable in the classical honest-but-curious model.
As we already mentioned, [21] proved that for quantum protocols in malicious setting it is impossible to compute securely any non-trivial function. In the light of this fact, Hardy and Kent [17] and independently Aharonov et al. [2] , have introduced the notion of cheat sensitive protocols which, instead of unconditional security, give only a guarantee that if one party cheats then the other has a proportional probability of detecting the mistrustful party. The result of Aharonov et al. [2] presents a protocol for quantum bit commitment they call it quantum bit escrow that ensures that whenever one party cheats with advantage ε then, at the end of the protocol, there exists a test that can be performed by the other party that detects the cheating with probability Ω(ε 2 ). However, the drawback of this protocol is that only one party can perform the test i.e. only one party can check whether the other cheated, and there is no mechanism that would allow fair resolving of this conflict. The authors state finding a protocol without this drawback as an open problem. Also the protocol presented by Hardy and Kent [17] is a weak variant of cheat sensitive quantim bit commitment in the sense that either Alice or Bob can detect a cheating party with non-zero probability. >From this perspective, our result can be seen as a cheat sensitive protocol for oblivious transfer (which subsumes bit commitment) with Ω(ε 2 ) trade-off, provided there is some way of allowing the party to test whether Bob computed correct value. Unfortunately, since we do not know how to implement such mechanism, the open problem is still unsettled.
Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is already familiar with the basics of quantum cryptography (see [2] for a description of the model and results that will be helpful). The model of quantum two-party computation we use in this paper is essentially the same as defined in [2] .
For a mixed quantum state ρ and a measurement O on ρ, let ρ O denote the classical distribution on the possible results obtained by measuring ρ accord-
O is some distribution p 1 , . . . , p t where p j denotes the probability that we get result j and O j are projections on the orthonormal subspaces corresponding to j. We use L 1 -norm to measure distance between two probability distributions p = (p 1 , . . . , p t ) and q = (q 1 , . . . , q t ) over {1, 2, . . . , t}:
In the following we investigate one sided two party quantum protocols F = (A, B), i.e. let x denote the input of Alice and y denote the input of Bob then at the end of the protocol Bob knows the result F (x, y) of the protocol. By purification we can assume that each protocol consists of two phases. In the first phase, called quantum phase, both parties perform only unitary transformations on the quantum states. In the second phase both parties only perform a measurement and maybe some computations on classical bits.
We say that a quantum protocol F = (A, B) for computing the function f is δ(ε)-susceptible with respect to Alice, if for every strategy A used by Alice the protocol F = (A , B) fulfills the following condition: Let ρ 
We say that F = (A, B) is δ(ε)-susceptible with respect to Bob, if for every strategy B used by Bob the protocol F = (A, B ) 
Both probabilities are taken over the random inputs of all the parties. We recall that we are interested in unconditional security, so in particular the above definition does not restrict the computational power of adversaries.
Let |0 ,|1 be an encoding of classical bits in our computational (perpendicular) basis. Let
2 , 1}, we denote the unitary operation of rotation by an angle of α · π/2. More formally:
We should note that this operation allows us to exchange between the bit encoding in perpendicular and in diagonal basis. Moreover, by applying R 1 we can flip the value of the bit encoded in any of those two bases.
Let
, where tr(A) denotes trace of matrix A. A fundamental theorem gives us a bound on L 1 -norm for the probability distributions on the measurement results:
Theorem 1 (see [1] 
B receives m and computes
Here, as usually, ⊕ denotes xor. To see that this protocol computes OT correctly if both parties are honest we remind that the operator R α R β commutes with R −1 α (this is not true in general, although it is true in two dimensions) and that R β is (up to a phase) a NOT-gate conditioned on β. We will now focus on the question whether Protocol 1 still retains security if we use it against malicious parties. The following theorem follows from Lemma 1 and 2 which will be proven in the remaining part of this section: 
where ρ Proof: Any cheating strategy A of Alice corresponding to her input a 0 , a 1 can be described as preparing some state |Φ = x∈{0,1} 2 |v x , x , sending the two rightmost qubits to Bob and performing some measurement O = {H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 } on this what she gets back after Bob's round, where H 0 ,H 1 ,H 2 , H 3 are four pairwise orthogonal subspaces being a division of whole Hilbert space that comes into play, such that, for l, k = 0, 1, if our measurement indicates the outcome corresponding to H 2k+l then it reflects Alice's belief that i = l and that the message m = k should be sent to Bob. We emphasis that we allow Alice's strategy to depend on her input.
The outline of the proof is the following. We first bond the fact that A achieves some advantage ε to a certain relation between H and |Φ . Then we show that this relation implies at least c A · ε 2 of noise in the value of a computed by Bob. We first consider the case when a 0 ⊕ a 1 = 0. Clearly, in this case m ⊕ a 0 = m⊕a 1 = β. So if Alice manages to compute m that is correct i.e. a = m⊕β = a i then she also knows the value of β. Thus, we can compute the probability of A computing the correct result, by computing the the probability that she can indicate the value of β correctly.
Let ρ a,b be a density matrix of Alice's system after Bob's round, corresponding to i = a and β = b. After some calculations we get:
where x t means flipping bit x t , i.e. x t = 1 − x t . We look first onto Alice's advantage that she can achieve. In order to cheat, Alice has to distinguish between two density matrices γ l = 1 2 ρ l,0 + 1 2 ρ l,1 for l ∈ {0, 1}, where γ l corresponds to i = l. By examination of the difference of those matrices we get, after some calculations, that:
where |V S = |v 00 + |v 11 and |V A = |v 10 − |v 01 . One can easily show that the 
Moreover, we assume that σ 0 + σ 1 ≥ σ 2 + σ 3 . If this is not the case we could satisfy this condition by altering the strategy A of Alice (by appropriate rotation of her basis) in such a way that the definitions of H k and H k+2 would swap leaving everything else unchanged.
We look now on the probability of obtaining the correct result by Alice. The probability p 0 of Alice getting outcome that convinces her that β = 0 in case when actually β = 1 is at least
So, by inequality |a − b|
Similar calculation of the probability p 1 of getting outcome convincing Alice that β = 1 when actually β = 0 yields that the probability of computing wrong result is at least
Hence, the lemma holds for the case a 0 ⊕ a 1 = 0. Since in case of a 0 ⊕a 1 = 1 the reasoning is completely analogous -we exchange only the roles of |V S and |V A and Alice has to know the value of β ⊕ i, instead of β in order to give the correct answer to Bob, the proof is concluded.
In fact, the above lemma is asymptotically tight since we can design a strategy of Alice which allows her to meet the quadratical bound imposed by the above lemma. To see this, consider |Φ = √ 1 − Δ|000 + √ Δ|110 . Intuitively, we label the symmetric and anti-symmetric part of |Φ with 0 and 1. Let H 2 = |01 01|, H 3 = 0. One can easily calculate that
and therefore ||ρ 0,0 − ρ 1,0 || t ≥ Δ(1 − Δ) − 2Δ. So, by Theorem 1 there exists a measurement {H 0 , H 1 } allowing us to distinguish between those two density matrices with Δ(1 − Δ) − 2Δ accuracy and moreover
To cheat, we use the following strategy A corresponding to her input a 0 = a 1 = 0. Alice sends the last two qubits of |Φ to Bob, after receiving the qubit back she applies the measurement M . If the outcome is H 2 then she answers m = a 0 ⊕ β = 1 to Bob and sets i = 0 with probability To see that this strategy gives correct result with probability greater than 1 − Δ 2 we should note that probability of outcome H 2 in case of β = 0 is 0 and in case of β = 1 is 1 − Δ. On the other hand, since β = 0 with probability 
Malicious Bob
Now, we analyze Bob's possibility of cheating. Our goal is to show: 
where ρ , for short. Our aim is to show that
Strategy B can be think of as a two step process. First a unitary transformation U is acting on |Φ a0,a1,h = |v ⊗ R α |a 1 The unitary transformation U can be described by a set of vectors {V
We present now, an intuitive, brief summary of the proof. Informally, we can think of U as about some kind of disturbance of the qubit R α |a 0 ⊕ h being sent back to Alice. First, we will show that in order to cheat Bob's U has to accumulate after Step 2, till the end of the protocol, some information about the value of a 0 ⊕h hidden in this qubit. On the other hand, to get the proper result i.e. the value of a 0 , this qubit (which is sent back to Alice) has to still contain actual information about encoded value being disturbed at the smallest possible degree. That implies for Bob a necessity of some sort of partial cloning of that qubit, which turns out to impose the desired bounds on possible cheating. We show this by first reducing the task of cloning to one where no additional hint in the form of R α |a 1 ⊕ h is provided and then we analyze this simplified process. In this way, this proof gives us a sort of quantitative non-cloning theorem. Although, it seems to concern only our particular implementation of the protocol, we believe that this scenario is useful enough to be of independent interests.
We analyze first Bob's advantage i.e. his information gain about a 1 . Wlog we may assume that Bob can distinguish better between two values of a 1 
Let now ρ j,k,l be a density matrix of the system before Bob's final measurement, corresponding to α = j · Using the triangle inequality we get that for the measurement O performed by Bob
Each component corresponds to different values of α and h⊕a 1 . And each component is symmetric to the other in such a way that there exists a straight-forward local transformation for Bob (i.e. appropriate rotation of the computational basis on one or both qubits) which transform any of above components onto another. So, we can assume wlog that the advantage in distinguishing between ρ 0,0,0 and
is the maximum component in the right-hand side of the inequality (1) and therefore we have ε ≤ 1 2 ε 0 . Let, for short, γ 0 = ρ 0,0,0 and γ 1 = ρ 0,1,1 . One can easily calculate that
As we can see to each value of m in above density matrices corresponds a pair of vectors which are critical for Bob's cheating. I.e. the better they can be distinguishable by his measurement the greater is his advantage. But, as we will see later, this fact introduces perturbation of the indication of the value of a 0 .
First, we take a look on the measurements H 0 , H 1 performed by Bob. Let us define σ 2m+p for p, m ∈ {0, 1} as follows
Let for m = 0, p 0 ∈ {0, 1} be such that σ p0 ≥ σ 1−p0 and similarly, for m = 1 let p 1 ∈ {0, 1} be such that σ 2+p1 ≥ σ 2+(1−p1) . Then we get
We should see first that the second term in the above sum corresponds to advantage in distinguishing between two values of a 1 by measurement H 2 , H 3 in case of a 0 = 0. But those subspaces reflect Bob's belief that a 0 = 1. Therefore, we have that
So, we can neglect this term because it is of the order of the square of the advantage (if not then our lemma would be proved). We get: onto the subspace H p1 if
else O 1 is a normalized orthogonal projection of |1V
onto H p1 . Hence we get
We proceed now, to investigation of the probability of obtaining the correct result i.e. the correct value of a 0 . Recall that Pr[a 1 = 0] = 1 2 so the density matrices corresponding to initial configuration of the second qubit -R α |a 1 ⊕ h is now exactly 1 2 |0 0| + 1 2 |1 1| even if we know h and α. So, from the point of view of the protocol, as perceived by Bob, those two density matrices are indistinguishable. Therefore, we can substitute the second qubit from the initial configuration with a density matrix 
Similarly, for j = 1 we have: In order to obtain the correct result Bob has to distinguish between the density matrices corresponding to two values of a 0 . In particular, he has to distinguish between density matrices γ 0 , γ 1 corresponding to two possible values of a 0 knowing that m = 0. These density matrices are:
Now, the probability of failure i.e. the probability that in case of m = 0 Bob's measurement indicates that a 0 = 0 if in fact it is a 0 = 1, is at least
But since the fact that W 2 ), we have that this probability is at least
Similarly we analyze density matrices γ 0 , γ 1 corresponding to two possible values of a 0 knowing that m = 1. These density matrices are equal to resp. γ 1 and γ 0 after changing |0 0| to |1 1|. Now, by repeating completely analogous estimation of failure's probability with usage of vectors |V and the lemma is proved.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the value of m doesn't need to be correlated in any way with value of a i . That is, Bob by using entanglement (for instance, straightforward use of Bell states) can make the value of m independent of a i and still acquire perfect knowledge about a i . He uses simple error-correction to know whether m = a i or m = 1 − a i . His problems with determining whether flip has occurred, start only when he wants additionally to accumulate some information about the value of a i ⊕ h.
Once again, it turns out that the quadratic susceptibility is asymptotically optimal. To see that this quadratical bound imposed by the above lemma can be achieved consider the following cheating strategy. Let U * be such that U * (|v ⊗ |l, j ) = |v j ⊗ |l, j . So, |V l,j j = |v j ⊗ |l and |V l,j 1−j = 0. Moreover, let v 0 |v 1 = √ 1 − Δ. As we can see, usage of U * accumulates some information about value of j = a 0 ⊕ h by marking it with two non-parallel (therefore possible to distinguish) vectors in Bob's system. We do now the following. We use U * on |v ⊗ R α |a 1 ⊕ h ⊕ R α |a 0 ⊕ h and send the last qubit to Alice. When we get the message m which is exactly a 0 with probability 5 of order 1 − Δ, we make an optimal measurement to distinguish between v 0 and v 1 . By Theorem 1 this optimal measurement has advantage of order √ Δ. So, after getting the outcome j , we know that Pr[j = a 0 ⊕ h] ≥ 
Concluding Remark
In this paper we have presented a Ω(ε 2 )-susceptible protocol for OT. An interesting question is whether we can find δ(ε)-susceptible protocols for other nontrivial functions and a reasonable δ and whether there exists a combinatorial characterization for such functions. 5 This can be easily computed -the perturbation arises when α = The next natural question to ask is whether there exists a δ(ε)-susceptible protocol for OT such that δ(ε) is asymptotically greater than Ω(ε 2 ). In fact, looking at the quadratic trade-off of the expression || |φ 1 φ 1 | − |φ 2 φ 2 | || t in the case of φ 1 |φ 2 = 1 − ε and the case of φ 1 |φ 2 = ε might suggest that the quadratic trade-off (which similarly arises in [2] ) is inherent for all non-trivial susceptible computable functions.
It is also interesting to know, whether our protocol could be transformed into one that does not need external reasons to make the correct computation of OT ((a 1 , a 2 ) , i) desirable for both parties i.e. a protocol in which failure to compute OT ((a 1 , a 2 ) , i) correctly would immediately lead to detection of cheating.
Finally, even if our protocol is very simple -thus may be relatively easy to implement -the constants hidden in Ω(ε 2 ) are rather impractical. Thus, trying to come up with a different protocol with better constants or some way of amplifying the trade-off of our protocol can be worthwhile.
